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1.1  Introduction 
There are numerous other avenues for research on this topic.  While this analysis 
has focused predominantly on financial based indicators for universities, it is 
acknowledged that universities are not purely profit-making organisations.  Bok (1982) 
discusses the social responsibilities of universities, noting that universities must be 
responsive to social needs as they have a near monopoly of intellectual resources in 
society and are also, by virtue of receiving funding from public sources, accountable to 
the public.  Caves (1984), in writing on Harry Johnson’s ideas about universities, 
comments on the notion of the university as a socioeconomic institution producing 
multiple outputs, some of which are public goods that are priced incorrectly.  According 
to Johnson, the economic function of universities is to create human capital with 
discernable market values but there are other functions, such as to foster the maturation 
of students and to filter students to the jobs society has to offer.  This chapter looks 
briefly at some of the other possible indicators for these institutions.  It is not intended 
to be exhaustive, but to merely illustrate some of the different bases available for 
comparing universities.  Other bases not looked at include the ranking of universities by 
The Good Universities Guide (Ashenden and Milligan, 2004) and the recent quality 
audits of Australian universities by the Australian Universities Quality Agency 
(Australian Universities Quality Agency, 2003). 
 
1.2  World Ranking of Universities 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University produces a ranking of the world’s best 500 
universities annually.  Universities are ranked on several indicators of academic or 
research performance, including alumni and staff winning Nobel Prizes and Fields 
Medals (the equivalent to a Nobel Prize in mathematics), highly cited researchers, 
articles published in Nature and Science, articles in the Science Citation Index-
expanded and Social Science Citation Index and academic performance with respect to 
the size of the institution.  For each indicator, the highest scoring institution is assigned 
a score of 100 and other institutions are calculated as a percentage of the top score.  
Scores are then weighted to arrive at a final overall score.  The highest scoring  
institution is then assigned a score of 100 and others are calculated as a percentage of 
the top score before being placed in descending order.  An institution’s rank reflects the 
number of institutions that sit above it (Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2004).  The 
rankings of Australian universities included in the top 500 are shown in Table 1.1.  The 
table shows that only 14 of the 39 universities in Australia (36 percent) rank within the 
top 500 in the world, with the members of the Group of Eight ranking the highest 
among the Australian institutions. 
 
Table 1.1 
AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES IN THE TOP 500 
RANKINGS OF WORLD UNIVERSITIES 
University Rank 
ANU 53 
University of Melbourne  82 
University of Queensland  101-152 
University of Sydney  101-152 
UNSW 153-201 
University of Western Australia  153-201 
Monash University  202-301 
University of Adelaide  202-301 
Macquarie University  302-403 
University of Newcastle  302-403 
University of Tasmania  302-403 
Flinders University  404-502 
La Trobe University  404-502 
Murdoch University  404-502 
Source: Shanghai Jiao Tong University (2004). 
 
Although this ranking of universities seems to have had a short history, it has 
generated a considerable amount of interest.  Shanghai University notes that their 
rankings fill a gap in the sector as there is no similar ranking of world universities using 
multiple criteria (Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2004).  Perhaps these rankings will 
become more important in the future for marketing purposes as the market for students 
becomes more competitive and these institutions attempt to differentiate themselves 
internationally. 
 
1.3  Revenue versus Earnings Maximisation 
In Section 4.4 on Earnings Quality, it became apparent that there was a negative 
relationship between accruals and cash flow from operations, where there was evidence  
that universities were engaging in earnings smoothing to avoid reporting losses.   
However, focusing only on earnings may miss another possibly important aspect, 
revenues, given that government funding to universities has fallen over time.  Is there a 
relationship between revenue and earnings for universities?  If so, then the case may 
resemble some sort of constrained optimisation problem similar to Baumol (1958, 
1959), where firms operating in imperfectly competitive markets seek to maximise 
revenue subject to a profit constraint (here, reporting earnings equal to or greater than 
zero).  Certainly, universities have some market power, holding near-monopolies in the 
provision of higher education. 
 
Table 1.2 reports average revenue and earnings per enrolment for institutions.  
There is a significant correlation between revenue and earnings; the Pearson correlation 
coefficient is .65 while the Spearman rank correlation coefficient is .70.  Both are 
significant at 1 percent.
1  This suggests that there is some evidence that revenue and 
earnings maximisation for these institutions are related.  While revenue per enrolment 
varies from between $5,000 and $46,000 per enrolment, earnings vary from between 
$40 to $3,000; relatively flat figures in comparison to revenues.  The standard error of 
revenue per enrolment is 1.31 versus .10 for earnings per enrolment.  This supports the 
earnings smoothing hypothesis discussed in Chapter 4 on Dimensions of Earnings 
Quality.  Perhaps the higher dispersion in revenue reflects the differential success 
institutions have in obtaining non-traditional sources of funding.  The larger institutions 
(such as the members of the Group of Eight) tend to have higher revenue/earnings per 
enrolment.  This size effect is likely to manifest itself in economies of scale for the 
larger institutions, given the low marginal cost of an additional enrolment (as staff 
salaries and overheads can be considered more or less fixed in the short run).   
Additionally, larger institutions may also benefit from positive network externalities 
which may drive revenue per enrolment. 
 
                                                 
1 One tailed test.  
Table 1.2 
REVENUE AND EARNINGS PER ENROLMENT 
 Revenue/Enrolment  ($’000/Enrolment)  Earnings/Enrolment  ($’000/Enrolment) 
 Institution  Institution 
1. Victoria  University  5.10 1. RMIT  .04
2.  University of Southern Queensland  5.41 2. University of Southern Queensland  .05
3.  Swinburne University of Technology  5.46 3. University of Canberra  .10
4.  Charles Sturt University  5.80 4. University of New England  .14
5.  University of Ballarat  6.57 5. University of South Australia  .15
6.  Northern Territory University  6.75 6. Australian Catholic University  .16
7.  Australian Catholic University  7.85 7. Victoria University  .18
8.  University of New England  8.14 8. Edith Cowan University  .27
9.  Southern Cross University  8.27 9. Charles Sturt University  .29
10.  Central Queensland University  8.36 10. University of Wollongong  .32
11.  Edith Cowan University  8.38 11. Swinburne University of Technology  .34
12.  RMIT  8.82 12. University of Newcastle  .38
13.  University of Western Sydney  9.24 13. University of Western Sydney  .38
14.  Deakin University  9.50 14. Northern Territory University  .41
15.  University of South Australia  9.63 15. Griffith University  .49
16.  Queensland University of Technology  9.63 16. Southern Cross University  .49
17.  University of Canberra  10.04 17. Queensland University of Technology  .52
18.  University of the Sunshine Coast  10.23 18. Macquarie University  .55
19.  University of Technology Sydney  10.31 19. University of Ballarat  .56
20. Macquarie  University  10.60 20. Deakin  University  .57
21.  Curtin University of Technology  10.90 21. Curtin University of Technology  .60
22.  Murdoch University  11.11 22. Murdoch University  .60
23.  University of Newcastle  11.85 23. University of Tasmania  .64
24.  Griffith University  12.01 24. University of Technology Sydney  .64
25.  University of Tasmania  13.37 25. University of Adelaide  .65
   Continued on next page… 
Table 1.2 
REVENUE AND EARNINGS PER ENROLMENT (continued) 
 Revenue/Enrolment  ($’000/Enrolment)  Earnings/Enrolment  ($’000/Enrolment) 
 Institution  Institution 
26.  James Cook University  13.56 26. Central Queensland University  .72
27.  University of Wollongong  14.97 27. James Cook University  .74
28.  University of Sydney  18.18 28. University of New South Wales  1.01
29.  University of New South Wales  19.69 29. University of Sydney  1.04
30.  University of Melbourne  19.86 30. University of Queensland  1.07
31.  University of Queensland  20.63 31. University of the Sunshine Coast  1.17
32.  University of Adelaide  21.83 32. Australian National University  1.58
33.  University of Western Australia  21.94 33. University of Western Australia  2.08
34.  Australian National University  45.78 34. University of Melbourne  2.81
Source: University Annual Reports.  
1.4  Student: Staff Ratios 
Another metric that institutions may focus on is the student: staff ratio.  Data on 
student: staff ratios was obtained from the AVCC for the period 2001-2003.  The ratios 
were averaged over the three years and are shown in Table 1.3.
2  This ratio is analogous 
to the ratio of customer to employee base for firms. 
 
There are several ways of interpreting this ratio.  The more productive the staff 
at the institution, the higher the ratio.  If the ratio is affected by the ability of the 
institution to earn revenues, then the higher the institution’s ability to raise revenue, the 
greater the ability to hire staff and the lower the ratio.  This would also suggest that the 
correlation between revenue per enrolment and student: staff ratio is negative, although 
the different measurement bases used to calculate the two ratios (enrolments versus 






and if this ratio is approximately constant, then we would expect revenue per enrolment 
to be highly negatively correlated with enrolments per member of staff.
3  However, this 
is not the case, as the Pearson correlation coefficient is significant
4 at -.46 while the 
Spearman rank coefficient is also significant
4 and has a value of -.59.  This indicates 
that institutions with higher revenue per enrolment are also likely to have lower student: 
staff ratios, on average.  As the absolute value of the correlation is less than one, it 
indicates that the marginal cost of staff with each additional dollar of revenue is less 
than one.  What drives this cost?  It is possible that the cost of academic staff is fixed in 
the short run as capacity is also fixed in the short run; so long as there is room in the 
lecture theatre, an additional student does not require hiring of an additional member of 
academic staff.  However, non-academic staff are likely to vary with the number of 
enrolments due to the administrative burden of handling extra students.  The ratio of 
academic to non-academic full-time and fractional full-time equivalent staff is shown in 
Table 1.4.  It is unclear whether a high or low ratio is desirable.  On one hand, a high 
                                                 
2 The AVCC data is drawn from DEST.  The AVCC notes that a number of institutions do not report all 
teaching staff to DEST, as they are not directly employed by the university and therefore are outside the 
scope of the Staff Collection. 
3 This may not be expected to hold for the data set used due to the different time periods used for 
grouping the two ratios. 
4 1 percent, one-tail test.  
ratio indicates that there are relatively more staff available for the provision of 
education, which is the function of the university.  However, a high ratio may also 
imply that academic staff have to undertake more administrative duties, which may 
detract from their academic duties.  As they are also likely to be relatively more 
expensive, a low ratio may provide leverage in order to allow academic staff to devote 
more time to academic duties. 
 
The student: staff ratio may also reflect differences in culture or specialisation 
across institutions; some courses may be constrained in their capacity for students, 
leading to a lower ratio, all else equal.  The lower student: staff ratio may also reflect 
institutions increasing their staff base in order to cope with the increased complexity of 
more students.  Perhaps in order to attract more students these institutions are increasing 
the number of courses offered, leading to a greater staff base and lower student: staff 
ratios or perhaps a lower student: staff ratio signals a better quality education, as there is 
more opportunity for interaction with staff.  It is interesting to note that the Group of 
Eight universities are all clustered within the lower half of the table and all have ratios 
below the average.  Perhaps institutions with higher revenues per head have more 
resources available and are able to justify hiring more staff.  
Table 1.3 
STUDENT: STAFF RATIO 
  Institution  Student: Staff Ratio 
1. The University of Western Australia  16.18 
2. The University of Adelaide  16.24 
3. The University of Sydney  16.37 
4. The University of New South Wales  16.95 
5. The Flinders University of South Australia  17.21 
6. The Australian National University  17.65 
7. The University of Melbourne  17.88 
8. Australian Catholic University  18.00 
9. Victoria University of Technology  18.00 
10. Griffith University  18.40 
11. Monash University  18.62 
12. La Trobe University  18.94 
13. University of Technology, Sydney  19.10 
14. Murdoch University  19.32 
15. The University of Queensland  19.36 
16. The University of Newcastle  19.49 
17. University of Tasmania  19.84 
18. University of Southern Queensland  20.54 
19. James Cook University  20.85 
20. Curtin University of Technology  20.87 
21. University of Canberra  21.16 
22. Northern Territory University  21.25 
23. University of Wollongong  21.32 
24. The University of New England  21.34 
25. Edith Cowan University  21.73 
26. University of Western Sydney  22.37 
27. Southern Cross University  22.40 
28. Macquarie University  22.62 
29. University of Ballarat  22.63 
30. Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology  22.71 
31. University of South Australia  22.80 
32. Swinburne University of Technology  22.88 
33. University of the Sunshine Coast  23.49 
34. Queensland University of Technology  24.02 
35. Deakin University  24.45 
36. Charles Sturt University  33.00 
37. Central Queensland University  35.21 
    
 Average  20.95 
Source: AVCC.  
Table 1.4 




1.  Central Queensland University  .47 
2.  University of the Sunshine Coast  .50 
3.  Queensland University of Technology  .56 
4.  Charles Sturt University  .57 
5. Edith  Cowan  University  .58 
6.  The University of Newcastle  .60 
7.  University of Southern Queensland  .60 
8. Griffith  University  .61 
9.  University of Ballarat  .64 
10. James  Cook  University  .64 
11. Australian  National  University  .64 
12.  University of New England  .65 
13.  University of Technology, Sydney  .67 
14. Deakin  University  .67 
15.  University of Canberra  .68 
16. Murdoch  University  .69 
17.  University of Queensland  .69 
18.  University of Western Australia  .70 
19.  Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology  .70 
20.  Flinders University of South Australia  .70 
21.  Southern Cross University  .72 
22.  Curtin University of Technology  .73 
23.  University of Sydney  .73 
24.  University of Notre Dame Australia  .73 
25.  University of South Australia  .75 
26.  University of Tasmania  .77 
27.  University of New South Wales  .78 
28.  University of Western Sydney  .81 
29.  University of Adelaide  .83 
30.  La Trobe University  .84 
31.  Victoria University of Technology  .84 
32.  University of Melbourne  .86 
33.  Australian Catholic University  .88 
34.  University of Wollongong  .91 
35. Monash  University  .95 
36. Northern  Territory  University  .97 
37. Macquarie  University  .97 
38.  Swinburne University of Technology  1.01 
    
 Average  .73 
Source: DEST. 
  
1.5  Equity in Australian Universities 
Part of the social responsibility of universities is to provide access to this public 
good to disadvantaged groups (Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small 
Business and Education Committee, 2001).  DEST identifies six target equity groups 
based on their history of relative disadvantage of accessing higher education (Nelson, 
2004).  These are Indigenous Australians; people from a non-English speaking 
background who arrived in Australia within the last ten years; people with disabilities; 
people from rural and isolated areas; women in non-traditional areas of study,
5 and 
people from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds.  Table 1.5 shows the 
proportion of domestic students in the target equity groups by institution.  Note that it is 
possible for institutions to have greater than 100 percent due to an individual student 
being placed in more than one equity group.  The results show that there is substantial 
dispersion in equity group participation across universities.  Queensland as a state 
appears to do well overall, with the top three ranking universities on this measure 
located in Queensland.  In addition, of the Group of Eight institutions, the University of 
Queensland has the highest proportion of domestic students in equity groups.  However, 
Bond University, also located in Queensland, is the lowest ranking of all institutions. 
 
Looking to staff, three measures are looked at.  The first is the proportion of 
Indigenous to total staff.  The second measure looks at the proportion of female staff.  
The final measure looks at the qualifications of academic staff by comparing the 
proportion of academic staff who hold a doctorate by research or coursework.
6  This is 
shown in Table 1.6. 
 
                                                 
5 Areas that are identified as non-traditional are agriculture and animal husbandry; architecture and 
building; business, administration and economics; engineering and surveying; and science (Nelson, 
2004). 
6 All data refers to full-time equivalent staff; comparable statistics are obtained when using the number of 
staff.  
Table 1.5 
STUDENT EQUITY PARTICIPATION BY INSTITUTION 
 Institution  Percentage  (%) 
1. Bond  University  28 
2. Macquarie  University  38 
3.  Australian Catholic University  41 
4.  University of Sydney  42 
5. Australian  National  University  45 
6.  University of Western Sydney  45 
7.  University of Melbourne  46 
8.  University of Notre Dame Australia  46 
9.  University of Technology, Sydney  46 
10.  University of New South Wales  47 
11.  University of Canberra  48 
12.  University of Adelaide  49 
13.  Swinburne University of Technology  50 
14.  University of Western Australia  52 
15. Griffith  University  52 
16. Edith  Cowan  University  53 
17.  Northern Territory University  54 
18.  Flinders University of South Australia  54 
19.  University of Newcastle  54 
20.  Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology  55 
21.  Queensland University of Technology  55 
22.  Curtin University of Technology  57 
23. Deakin  University  58 
24.  University of Wollongong  58 
25. Monash  University  58 
26.  Victoria University of Technology  64 
27.  University of South Australia  65 
28. Murdoch  University  65 
29.  University of Queensland  66 
30. La  Trobe  University  67 
31.  Charles Sturt University  79 
32.  University of New England  85 
33. James  Cook  University  96 
34.  University of Tasmania  98 
35.  Southern Cross University  103 
36.  University of Ballarat  110 
37.  University of Southern Queensland  115 
38.  Central Queensland University  146 
39.  University of the Sunshine Coast  158 
    
 Average  61 
Source: DEST.  
Table 1.6 
STAFF EQUITY MEASURES BY INSTITUTION 
(Percentages) 
 Institution  Indigenous  Female  Doctorate 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1.  Swinburne University of Technology  .00  37.60  40.09 
2.  University of the Sunshine Coast  .00  51.03  59.38 
3. RMIT  .11  42.21  39.56 
4.  University of Ballarat  .17  41.71  44.25 
5. Monash  University  .18  42.26  60.34 
6.  University of Melbourne  .19  44.77  60.63 
7.  La Trobe University  .26  47.28  32.81 
8.  Queensland University of Technology  .27  43.03  53.62 
9.  University of Queensland  .27  42.32  58.39 
10. Australian  National  University  .29  40.40  79.86 
11.  University of New South Wales  .33  38.84  50.03 
12.  Victoria University of Technology  .33  41.05  25.91 
13. Macquarie  University  .35  39.70  62.27 
14.  University of Sydney  .40  41.56  61.81 
15.  University of Canberra  .42  44.13  37.99 
16. Deakin  University  .49  49.00  51.14 
17. Griffith  University  .50  39.18  62.23 
18.  University of Western Sydney  .51  43.06  43.40 
19.  University of Adelaide  .52  40.05  70.22 
20.  University of Tasmania  .56  41.84  63.02 
21.  University of Southern Queensland  .58  45.49  39.06 
22.  Central Queensland University  .76  46.57  16.67 
23.  University of Western Australia  .83  44.72  67.44 
24.  Australian Catholic University  .88  50.84  39.02 
25.  Charles Sturt University  .89  46.54  39.70 
26.  University of South Australia  .93  45.56  42.89 
27.  Flinders University of South Australia  .94  49.03  58.18 
28.  University of Technology, Sydney  .97  37.17  52.86 
29.  University of Wollongong  1.20  38.50  64.54 
30.  Curtin University of Technology  1.21  42.79  47.96 
31. Murdoch  University  1.33  42.11  57.45 
32.  University of New England  1.65  45.59  65.79 
33.  James Cook University  1.67  47.04  56.36 
34. Edith  Cowan  University  2.01  46.57  47.33 
35.  University of Newcastle  2.12  48.73  59.61 
36.  University of Notre Dame Australia  2.54  55.84  27.54 
37. Northern  Territory  University  2.89  47.37  33.55 
38.  Southern Cross University  3.13  39.52  36.92 
        
 Average  .63  43.03  54.39 
Source: DEST.  
From column 2 of Table 1.6, it can be seen that Indigenous staff are in the 
minority at all institutions.  This is reflected in student equity statistics, where 
Indigenous students are also the minority, although the representation of Indigenous 
students is greater than that of Indigenous staff.  Looking to the gender balance across 
institutions in column 3, for the majority of institutions, females are in the minority with 
the exception of the University of the Sunshine Coast and University of Notre Dame 
where the majority of staff are female.  However, the gender balance is not overly 
biased toward males; with institutions on average with an approximate 57: 43 split 
between males and females.  Finally, the majority of academic staff in Australian 
universities hold doctorates (column 4), with 17 of the 38 institutions (45 percent) with 
less than 50 percent of academic staff holding doctorates.  ANU has the highest 
proportion of doctorates (80 percent) while Central Queensland University has the 
lowest proportion of doctorates (17 percent).  UNSW is evenly balanced with 50 percent 
of all academic staff holding doctorates.  If the academic qualifications of academic 
staff are an indicator of the quality of staff and teaching, there appears to be high 
variability across institutions. 
 
1.6  Future Changes to University Governance 
The Commonwealth Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST) 
released the National Governance Protocols in 2004.  They set out requirements that 
higher education providers have to meet in order to qualify for grants under the 
Commonwealth Grant Scheme.  The protocols are of interest as they include changes to 
university governance, many of which align universities to their private sector 
counterparts. 
 
Members of university councils owe fiduciary duties to the university under 
employment and common law by virtue of their appointment.  The protocols are, in 
many respects, merely formalising these duties in express terms.  It is widely 
acknowledged that universities have multiple stakeholder interests; so whose interests 
do council members represent?  In other words, just as asked by the Universities in 
Crisis report (Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education 
Committee, 2001), what is a university?  Interviews with Vice-Chancellors have 
identified the main stakeholders of a university as the students, the government, the 
community, staff and graduates.  Most Australian universities have representation from 
these different stakeholder groups on the university governing body.  
 
Of particular interest are protocols 2, 3, 4 and 5.  Protocol 2 requires that the 
governing body of a higher education provider must appoint the Vice-Chancellor as the 
Chief Executive Officer and monitor his/her performance.  During the course of 
interviews with Vice-Chancellors it became apparent that they already consider 
themselves as the CEOs of these institutions, so this requirement appears to merely 
formalise this role. 
 
Protocol 3 details the duties of members of the governing body (commonly 
known as the University Council).  In particular, duties of members must include the 
requirements to: 
 
“(a)  act always in the best interests of the higher education provider as 
a whole, with this obligation to be observed in priority to any duty 
a member may owe to those electing or appointing him or her; 
(b)   act in good faith, honestly and for a proper purpose; 
(c)   exercise appropriate care and diligence; 
(d)   not improperly use their position to gain an advantage for 
themselves or someone else; and 
(e)   disclose and avoid conflicts of interest (with appropriate 
procedures for that purpose similar to those for public 
companies).” 
 
What is apparent is the similarity between these requirements and those under 
the Corporations Act governing companies.  Requirements (a) and (b) are similar to 
s181, requiring directors of companies to act in good faith in the best interests of the 
corporation and for a proper purpose.  Requirement (c) is the embodiment of s180, 
requiring directors to exercise their powers and discharge their duties with reasonable 
care and diligence.  Requirement (d) resembles s182, where directors must not 
improperly use their position to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else.  
Requirement (e) is similar to the fiduciary duties of directors to avoid conflict of interest 
situations as well as their duty under statute in s191, where directors with a material 
personal interest must give notice to other directors.  It is clear that these requirements 
are formalising the duties of university councils, leading to greater alignment between 
universities and companies and greater accountability of these higher education 
providers to their stakeholders.  However, company directors are paid; outside members 
of council are not, typically.  What motivates council members to act in the interests of 
the university?  Public spiritedness?  Altruism?   While this is not completely far  
fetched, it is in stark contrast to the corporate world where self-interest dominates. 
 
In addition, protocol 3 goes further than the Corporations Act on the issue of 
removal of members of the governing body.  Under s203C and s203D, companies are 
only required to pass an ordinary resolution to remove a director (simple majority), 
while the requirement for removal of university council members requires a two-thirds 
majority.  Perhaps this is to ensure greater stability in universities or to prevent 
stakeholder groups from using their power of representation in undesirable ways. 
 
Protocol 4 requires the governing body to provide professional development for 
members to build the expertise of the body and ensure that members are aware of the 
nature of their duties and responsibilities.  There is no express provision in the 
Corporations Act requiring the same of corporate directors, however self improvement 
is implied under the common law duty to exercise care and to be familiar with the 
affairs of the company. 
 
Protocol 5 addresses the size of the governing body, specifying that it must not 
exceed 22 members, with at least two members having financial expertise and at least 
one member having commercial expertise.  In addition, there must be a majority of 
external independent members.  Protocol 6 recommends that the term of council 
members should not generally exceed 12 years.  The requirement for independent 
directors is similar to principle 2 of the ASX Corporate Governance Council Principles 
of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (2003), that 
companies should structure boards to add value.  The recommendations state that in 
order to achieve best practice, a majority of the board should be independent directors 
and that the tenure of independent directors should be monitored, as independence 
declines over time, but stop short of specifying a recommended time period of tenure.
7  
While the recommendations are not compulsory in a strict sense, ASX Listing Rule 
4.10.3 requires that listed companies must disclose the extent to which the best practice 
recommendations have been followed and if they have not been followed, the reasons 
for failing to do so. 
 
                                                 
7 The United Kingdom Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors (Higgs, 2003) 
suggests a term of 10 years for director tenure.  
Looking at the size of Boards prior to the protocols,
8 data from the AVCC as at 
May 2003 shows that the average size of the council falls within the 22 member limit at 
21 members.  Thirty-four of the thirty-eight institutions (89 percent) have 22 members 
or less, with four institutions (11 percent) having more than 22 members.  Remarkably, 
21 out of 38 universities (55 percent) have 21 or 22 members on council.  This indicates 
that the majority of universities will have little difficulty or find it necessary to 
downsize the council in order to comply with the protocol regarding university council 
size.  The size of university councils as at May 2003 is shown in Table 1.7. 
 
Comparing the size of the governing body in universities to that in the private 
sector, Stapledon and Lawrence (1997) look at the top 100 companies by market 
capitalisation listed on the Australian Stock Exchange in 1995 and find that the average 
size of the Board is 8.89 members.  This is substantially less than the 22 member limit 
for universities and the average size of university councils.  Breaking down board 
composition, they find that there is an average of 6.52 non-executive directors on the 
Board, or equivalently, the average proportion of non-executive directors on the board is 
73 percent.  In addition, 95 percent of companies have a majority of non-executive 
directors.  This is consistent with the protocol for higher education providers stipulating 
a majority of independent members.  However, neither the Corporations Act, ASX 
Recommendations nor the ASX Listing Rules specify that members on corporate boards 
must have financial or commercial expertise.  In this sense, the protocols for higher 
education providers impose a higher duty of care on university Councils than that on 
corporate Boards of Directors, however in others the standard for members of the Board 
of Directors is higher than that for Council members.  In particular, in relation to one 
issue close to the heart of this dissertation, remuneration, the disclosure rules are more 
stringent for companies than public sector entities.  Introduction of International 
Accounting Standards in 2005 will require disclosure of salaries, other benefits (such as 
bonuses and allowances) and equity compensation (such as options and shares) for each 
director as well as the top five executives, replacing the disclosure of executive 
remuneration in bands (also the current requirement for public sector entities) 
(Australian Accounting Standards Board, 2004).  In addition, ASX recommendation 9 
requires companies to explain their remuneration policy and the link between top 
executive remuneration and performance.  There is no similar recommendation 
                                                 
8 The date to meet the protocols for a higher education provider to receive a 2.5 percent increase in the 
basic grant amount for the 2005 grant year under the Commonwealth Grant Scheme is 31 August 2004 
(DEST, 2004b).  
applicable to universities. 
 
Table 1.7 
SIZE OF UNIVERSITY COUNCILS 
  Institution  Number of Members 
1. Bond  University  13 
2.  Australian Catholic University  16 
3.  University of Tasmania  17 
4.  Southern Cross University  18 
5.  University of Western Sydney  18 
6.  University of Wollongong  18 
7.  Charles Sturt University  19 
8. Macquarie  University  19 
9.  University of New England  19 
10.  University of Newcastle  19 
11. Curtin  University  20 
12. Northern  Territory  University  20 
13.  University of the Sunshine Coast  20 
14. Deakin  University  21 
15.  Edith Cowan University  21 
16. Flinders  University  21 
17.  La Trobe University  21 
18. Monash  University  21 
19.  University of Adelaide  21 
20.  University of Western Australia  21 
21.  University of Melbourne  21 
22.  University of New South Wales  21 
23.  University of South Australia  21 
24.  University of Technology Sydney  21 
25.  Central Queensland University  22 
26.  Queensland University of Technology  22 
27. RMIT  22 
28.  Swinburne University of Technology  22 
29. Australian  National  University  22 
30.  University of Ballarat  22 
31.  University of Canberra  22 
32.  University of Southern Queensland  22 
33.  University of Sydney  22 
34. Victoria  University  22 
35. Griffith  University  25 
36. Murdoch  University  25 
37. James  Cook  University  26 
38.  University of Queensland  35 
    
 Average  21 
Source: AVCC. 
 
Overall, it appears that the future for university governance is moving toward 
alignment with that of corporations, with a focus on greater accountability and  
responsibility.  However, it appears that there are still fundamental differences between 
the operations of universities and councils, requiring greater representation on the 
governing bodies of universities.  Perhaps this reflects the relationships between 
universities and their multiple stakeholders, as opposed to the single onus of 
corporations to maximise shareholder wealth. 
 
1.7  Pressures at the Top 
One possible explanation for the remuneration discount to Vice-Chancellors 
relative to CEOs
9 may be that the position of a Vice-Chancellor is not risky.  This 
section looks at four instances where Vice-Chancellor turnover has been associated with 
universities in crisis; namely the turnover of Vice-Chancellors at RMIT, the University 
of New South Wales (UNSW), Monash and the University of Adelaide. 
 
Lieu (2003) found in his study of Australian company CEOs that external 
appointments tended to occur where firms were in crisis, marked by poor performance.  
In the case of universities, it is not clear that they appoint externals when in crisis; while 




Vice-Chancellors face the same public pressures as CEOs to produce results or 
resign.  The latest resignation of Professor Ruth Dunkin at RMIT appears to have been 
imminent for some time.  The implementation of a new computer system in late 2001 
was a disaster, leading to Victorian Education Minister Lynne Kosky calling for an 
improvement in university finances or the Vice-Chancellor’s resignation (Tomazin and 
Guy, 2003).  An inquiry by the Victorian Auditor General into the affairs of RMIT 
found significant deficiencies in the financial management of the institution (Auditor 
General Victoria, 2003).  Also in 2003, the Chancellor resigned from his post, along 
with seven members of the Council.  Matters appeared to improve in 2004, with the 
2003 audited accounts showing a surplus of $15 million, however in August 2004 just 
prior to Professor Dunkin’s resignation, the university announced a $20-30 million 
shortfall in budgeted revenue.  It is clear that the role of a Vice-Chancellor is in the 
public eye, however it took approximately two years for Professor Dunkin’s turnover to 
                                                 
9 Discussed in Section 5.7: Comparing Remuneration: The Case of Vice-Chancellors versus CEOs. 
10 Professor Peter Darvall, an internal candidate, was appointed Vice-Chancellor of Monash University to 
serve for the time required to select a longer term replacement Vice-Chancellor (Monash University, 
2002b).  The successor, Professor Richard Larkins, was an external appointment.  
occur following poor financial performance.  This may reflect the finding that there 
appears to be little evidence of performance related turnover in universities.  The 
resignation of several council members may reflect frustration at the inability of council 
to remove a poorly performing Vice-Chancellor expediently, leading to greater losses 
for the institution.  Given RMIT’s financial troubles, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
new Vice-Chancellor has a background in commercial business, suggesting that the 
university made a conscious decision to appoint a candidate who was likely to possess 
the skills necessary to turn the institution around. 
 
UNSW has experienced three Vice-Chancellors in two years.  The first was that 
of Professor John Niland who served two five-year terms before his turnover in 2002, 
eighteen months before his term was due to end.  The reason behind his departure was 
attributed to a lack of council support.  The second (and latest) turnover was that of his 
successor, Professor Rory Hume in 2004, who left with three years of his term 
remaining after a breakdown in relations with the university council.  In addition, 
Professor Hume also faced pressure regarding a case of scientific misconduct regarding 
a medical researcher member of staff (Cooper, 2004).  What appears to differ in this 
case and that of RMIT is that the university council here appears to have substantial 
power to remove the Vice-Chancellor.  However, rather than being a good thing, in this 
case the council does not appear to be effective, being faction ridden with members 
acting in their own interests rather than those of the institution.  UNSW Council 
member Catherine Rossi is of the opinion that 11 of the 21 members (elected by the 
graduates, staff and students) are unsuited to the task of leading the organisation due to 
a lack of skills (Dodd and Marshall, 2004). 
 
In August 2001, the Vice-Chancellor at the University of Adelaide, Professor 
Mary O’Kane, resigned following loss of support from senior management.  Following 
her resignation, decision making powers were restored from a small executive to the 
council, improving accountability and transparency measures at the University 
(Crewther, 2003).  These three cases highlight the importance of good governance in 
universities, illustrating how a bad or ineffective governing body can inflict costs on an 
institution. 
 
Finally, turnover at Monash University of Vice-Chancellor Professor David 
Robinson occurred in July 2002, after it was discovered he had plagiarised text in books  
published earlier in his career as a researcher in the United Kingdom in the 1970s and 
1980s.  A month prior to his resignation, the council unanimously passed a vote of 
confidence in Professor Robinson.  Following the plagiarism allegations, the situation 
did an about-turn, as students and staff called for his resignation.  Despite occurring 
twenty years ago, the council and Vice-Chancellor reached a consensus over his 
resignation, acknowledging the need to mitigate the negative reputation effects of the 
incident on the university (Monash University, 2002a). 
 
Despite these case studies being restrictive in only analysing specific instances 
of intense pressure, interviews with Vice-Chancellors have also found that the role is 
regarded as complex.  Vice-Chancellors believe that the demands on the institution have 
increased over time and that there is now more accountability to governments and 
stakeholders, with the implication that there is more risk borne by the Vice-Chancellor.  
There is also a belief that the role has become more competitive, with more pressure to 
perform and differentiate oneself as being an effective Vice-Chancellor.  The nature of 
the role has also changed, so that there is more of an emphasis on professional 
administration and management due to an increasing proportion of funding coming 
from non-traditional sources. 
 
At a minimum, the above case studies call into question the view that the role of 
a Vice-Chancellor is not risky.  Vice-Chancellors are in the public domain with their 
activities and performance monitored and calls made for improvement or resignation 
when judged sub-standard.  Despite performance being an ill-defined concept for 
universities, the public does appear to be able to differentiate between actions perceived 
as good or bad and are vocal in voicing their disapproval.  In contrast to CEOs who are 
accountable predominantly to their shareholders, Vice-Chancellors are accountable and 
must answer to a wider group incorporating the different stakeholder interests in the 
university. 
 
1.8  Summary 
Due to the multi-faceted nature of universities, there are many different 
measures, both financial and non-financial, on which they may be evaluated.  As 
performance is not clearly defined for universities, this is an important consideration.  
The future of the university sector appears to be moving toward alignment with the 
corporate sector and the regulations governing companies.  This is consistent with the  
view that universities are moving away from the nonprofit end of the spectrum toward 
more commercial practices. 
 
For those who view the role of the Vice-Chancellor as relatively safe from 
pressure, an analysis of four instances of pressure suggests otherwise.  Universities are 
in the public spotlight and as a result, so too is the role of the Vice-Chancellor.  What is 
apparent is the importance of good, effective corporate governance in these institutions.  
Perhaps the alignment of university practices to those of corporations is a result of 
policymakers recognising this and attempting to minimise the losses inflicted on these 





2  TITLE 7 
 
2.1  Summary of Dissertation 
The earliest university still in operation originated in the year 258, meaning that 
universities have been part of society for at least 1,750 years (wordiQ.com, 2004).  In 
contrast, many of the earliest equivalents to modern day corporations, the European 
guilds, were formed in the middle ages (circa 1100), making companies only about half 
as old as universities, at 900 years (Wikipedia, 2004).  Family companies appear to have 
more longevity, the oldest still in operation being approximately 1,400 years old, 
however, of the still operating listed companies, the oldest is only approximately 225 
years old (O’Hara and Mandel, 2004).  Comparing universities and corporations, the 
two models of organisation are very distinct.  In the corporate model, organisations exist 
for efficiency reasons; it is the profit motive that drives companies to use resources 
efficiently.  Accordingly, firms exist as they are the least costly way to organise 
transactions, rather than relying on the market system (Coase, 1937).  An efficient 
organisation acts to maximise total value, in other words, to maximise profits (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992).  In contrast, the traditional view is that universities act in the public 
interest, are not under the same pressures as firms to perform or perish and are not 
subject to discipline from capital markets or the market for corporate control.  Due to 
the shifting balance between their different social interests and lack of a single 
objective, universities have, in effect, an indefinite lifespan. 
 
What is so special about a university?  Summers (2003) argues that part of the 
answer is that the most valuable assets of a university are not its physical capital, but the 
people in the community and the knowledge they possess.  Another is the less formal, 
decentralised environment of the university where guidelines and resources are provided 
in order to create environments where individuals can do their best work.  Summers 
comments that the nurturing of the development and flow of ideas is what the success of 
today’s firms is dependent upon and that they could benefit by adopting some aspects of 
this culture.  The ability of universities to encourage and reward creativity and novel 
thinking is partly how universities add value to society.  By allowing ideas to reign 
supreme, universities position themselves to be able and ready to respond to new  
challenges.  Perhaps it is in this that universities have stood the test of time. 
 
What are the forces driving the corporate and university models to converge?  
Firstly, there is funding pressure on universities as public funding declines as a 
proportion of total revenue.  The mechanism of funding allocation also creates pressure 
to attract students, analogous to firms looking to increase revenue by increasing their 
customer base.  Universities are now finding that they have to take charge of their 
finances in order to ensure that they remain financially viable.  For firms, as corporate 
governance and social responsibility becomes an increasing focus, they have had to 
consider the interests of non-owner stakeholders.  As a result, the two models are 
moving away from the extremes of the distribution toward one another. 
 
Vice-Chancellors are the heads of these institutions, analogous to the Chief 
Executive Officers of firms.  However, there is a disparity in the amount of knowledge 
about the two markets.  This dissertation set out to address this imbalance. 
 
This dissertation finds that universities are displaying some of the same 
behaviours as companies, as seen by their reluctance to report losses and the use of 
accruals to smooth earnings.  However, they differ somewhat in that accruals do not 
seem to be used opportunistically for earnings management purposes but seem to be 
used to improve earnings quality.  Earnings quality measured by accruals appears to be 
improving over time for universities and the earnings persistence of accruals and cash 
flows are not significantly different.  This is in contrast to the corporate experience, 
where accruals have lower persistence than cash flows, due to earnings management.  
Perhaps one manifestation of how universities are responding to the increasing 
corporatisation of the sector is by becoming more accountable, as the financial health of 
these institutions becomes an increasing focus. 
 
Focusing on earnings themselves, there appears to be evidence of earnings 
smoothing occurring in universities, with an almost one for one negative relationship 
between the accrual and cash flow components of earnings.  These institutions appear to 
be using accruals to report flat or low positive earnings, reigning in high positive cash 
flows (saving earnings for “rainy days”) and pushing negative cash flows upward 
(borrowing earnings from the future).  The distribution of earnings for these institutions 
shows that earnings are clustered around low positive values, with few instances of  
negative earnings results. 
 
The other measure of earnings quality examined was the incidence of audit 
qualifications.  These do not appear to give a good indication of the quality of earnings 
due to the majority of qualifications a result of inconsistency between the treatment of 
items as required by the Commonwealth Department of Education, Science and 
Training and Australian Accounting Standards.  However, as these inconsistencies are 
resolved over time, the expectation is that audit qualifications in the future will be more 
reflective of poor earnings quality and reflect a more serious flaw in the underlying 
accounts of the institution. 
 
Over time, earnings quality appears to be driven more by general, rather than 
local factors and there has been convergence in earnings quality between the Group of 
Eight and non-Group of Eight institutions, with the latest data showing that the non-
Group of Eight institutions have higher earnings quality than the Group of Eight.  This 
shows that the pressure on universities has been sector-wide, with the possibility that 
there has been slightly less pressure on Group of Eight institutions relative to non-
Group of Eight as they are insulated to an extent from these pressures due to the prestige 
afforded by membership of the Group of Eight. 
 
Looking to the market for Vice-Chancellors, it appears that there is an over-
representation of Vice-Chancellors in Australia from natural and physical science and 
society and culture backgrounds and an under-representation of Vice-Chancellors from 
management and commerce and information technology backgrounds.  This may reflect 
the opportunity cost of postgraduate study in each respective area, given that the Vice-
Chancellors in the sample all have postgraduate qualifications. 
 
Regarding where Vice-Chancellors studied to obtain their qualifications, it 
appears that the majority of Vice-Chancellors obtained their undergraduate qualification 
in Australia before choosing to go overseas for their postgraduate qualification.  This 
situation holds regardless of whether the sample is split into internally versus externally 
appointed Vice-Chancellors.  However, Vice-Chancellors who obtained their 
undergraduate qualification in Australia are almost equally as likely to go overseas as to 
remain in Australia for their postgraduate study, while those who obtained their 
Bachelors qualification from a foreign institution are three times as likely to also  
undertake postgraduate study overseas than in Australia. 
 
Australian Vice-Chancellors tend to be appointed later in life relative to 
Australian CEOs and do not have shorter tenures.  The relationship between tenure and 
age of appointment is roughly the same between Vice-Chancellors and CEOs, with an 
additional year in age of appointment leading to a four to five month reduction in 
average tenure.  These similarities may reflect the common elements between the two 
roles; Vice-Chancellors interviewed are of the belief that their role is no less difficult 
than that of a CEO and just as complex, if not more so, due to the management of 
multiple stakeholder interests and the juggling of the role of a university to provide a 
public good against the need to remain financially viable.  A more formal model of 
Vice-Chancellor tenure and turnover also confirms that age has a negative relationship 
to average tenure and also that the average length of tenure appears to be increasing 
over time, which may indicate greater complexity of the role or a move toward 
implementation of more long-term performance measures over time.  One Vice-
Chancellor interviewed commented that the length of tenure in the role would tend to be 
long, due to the time needed to implement strategic objectives and then monitor and 
evaluate performance toward those goals. 
 
Vice-Chancellor appointment differs from the corporate process, where there is 
evidence of outsider handicapping in order to encourage greater productivity from 
insiders.  In the case of Vice-Chancellors, there is little evidence of handicapping, with 
institutions equally as likely to appoint an internal as an external candidate.  There is no 
evidence of a Group of Eight effect in Vice-Chancellor appointment, which suggests a 
lack of culture effects in these institutions.  For Australian CEO appointments, the 
majority of appointees are internals, with externals generally appointed when the 
company is going through a period of poor performance, while for universities, the 
majority of appointees are externals.  Perhaps the search costs regarding external 
candidates for firms is higher than that for universities, which may reflect greater 
heterogeneity in applicant quality for CEOs relative to Vice-Chancellors.  Certainly, 
when comparing the academic qualifications of the two groups, while all Vice-
Chancellors have some postgraduate qualification, only six percent of CEOs have a 
postgraduate qualification.  In addition, 17 percent of CEOs have no tertiary 
qualification.  This may reflect differences in the culture of the two roles; while it is 
possible for an entrepreneur to start a firm and be its CEO, for universities, academic  
credibility is important, given their role as institutions of higher education. 
 
Modelling Vice-Chancellor remuneration, there is a positive relationship 
between tenure and remuneration, which may reflect rewards to the accumulation of 
valuable institution-specific human capital.  Interviews with Vice-Chancellors 
highlighted an appreciation for the differences between the role of Vice-Chancellor 
across institutions, due to perceived differences in the culture and objectives of each 
university.  There is also a weak relationship between size and remuneration, with larger 
institutions having higher remuneration, with the marginal effect evaluated at the means 
being a 7 cent increase in remuneration for every one thousand dollar increase in the 
asset base.  This relationship is also found in studies conducted on the remuneration of 
university Presidents in the United States.  Although the magnitude of the size effect is 
small, it is important for measuring the discount to Vice-Chancellors relative to CEOs 
and also the relative over- and under-payment of Vice-Chancellors, as both of these 
controlled for differences in size.  In addition, the market for Vice-Chancellors appears 
to be national rather than local, with no significant regional effects in remuneration 
setting. 
 
Comparing Australian Vice-Chancellors to their counterparts in the United 
States and United Kingdom, Australian Vice-Chancellors clearly top the stakes.  Not 
only is the real purchasing power of their remuneration higher by 43 percent measured 
according to the Big Mac index, the tax considerations are more favourable and the 
quality of life in Australia exceeds that of the United States and United Kingdom.  Vice-
Chancellors in the United Kingdom, on the other hand, appear to be the losers in the 
international comparison, with lower real remuneration and a less favourable tax 
situation.  This may be an important consideration for potential future Australian 
university Vice-Chancellors currently residing overseas.  It may also reflect that 
Australian Vice-Chancellors are better, on average, than their international counterparts, 
although it must be emphasised that the comparisons are made purely on the basis of 
remuneration only, with no controls for size differences between institutions. 
 
Finally, comparing the remuneration of Australian Vice-Chancellors to 
Australian CEOs, while the sensitivity of remuneration to size is similar, those 
individuals accepting the role of Vice-Chancellor receive on average, a discount of 60 
percent relative to the private sector.  This is consistent with the disparity found  
between United States Presidents and CEOs.  It appears that the market for Vice-
Chancellors is separate from the market for CEOs, despite the belief of Vice-
Chancellors that their roles are equally, if not more so, demanding and complex. 
 
Overall, it appears that while there is considerable convergence between 
universities and corporations and the role of Vice-Chancellors relative to CEOs, the 
labour market does not appear to be pricing Vice-Chancellors on the same basis as 
CEOs.  Perhaps this dates back to the roots of universities as public nonprofit 
institutions, although the evidence would suggest that Australian universities have in 
reality moved away from this traditional view. 
 
2.2  Implications for Universities 
Firstly, it is apparent that universities have significant catching up to do in terms 
of the disclosure of remuneration of the Vice-Chancellor and senior management.   
Companies disclose more information at a finer level of detail than universities and are 
set to increase the extent of disclosure in future.  If universities are becoming more like 
corporations, then it is sensible to expect that there will be greater pressure on them to 
be at least as transparent as corporations, given that they are accountable to the public 
and society as a whole, as opposed to the firm’s responsibility only to its shareholders.  
The downside to increased disclosure is that it may lead to a ratcheting up of 
remuneration.  The Financial Reporting Council believes that disclosure leads to 
compensation increases as firms are under pressure to ensure top management is not 
underpaid (Mellish, 2004).  However, given that the current quality of disclosure is so 
poor and the increasing importance of corporate governance in universities, it is 
possible that state Auditor-Generals or even public sector accounting standards may 
increase the disclosure requirements for these institutions.  The private sector has and 
will experience an overhaul of its accounting standards as convergence to International 
Accounting Standards goes through in 2005.  With the Public Sector Committee of the 
International Federation of Accountants undertaking to develop a set of International 
Public Sector Accounting Standards based on International Accounting Standards, it is 
possible that in the future, universities (and other public sector organisations) will be 
forced to provide finer detailed disclosure regarding remuneration. 
 
Secondly, given that performance is an ill-defined concept for universities, how 
will their role as a social institution be affected as they move toward more corporate- 
style practices?  Financial data is relatively easy to compare between institutions and 
across time, while non-financial measures are more subjective and difficult to quantify – 
how, for example, can universities effectively compare their contribution to the 
community?  It is possible that there will be a move to standardise the non-financial 
indicators these institutions use to evaluate themselves and it is also possible that 
universities will be required to disclose these measures and have them audited.   
Currently, only universities in Western Australia are required to have these indicators 
audited and reported in their annual reports.  As universities face pressure to maintain 
the quality of their services in the face of greater funding pressures, this is one method 
that may be used to provide some level of assurance to their stakeholders. 
 
Finally, as university councils become more accountable for their actions, how 
will this affect the remuneration of council members?  In particular, how will this affect 
the remuneration of the Chancellor?  University Chancellors today are the face of the 
university council and are seen as the individuals ultimately responsible for the 
monitoring of the Vice-Chancellor’s performance.  We have seen the detrimental effect 
of poor governance on these institutions.  As changes (such as the National Governance 
Protocols) impose greater accountability on council members, will Chancellors and 
other external independent members of council be better monitors if they take on more 
risk and are remunerated for this?  Although it is difficult to imagine that members of 
council (or the Vice-Chancellor) take their positions purely for pecuniary gain, it is also 
implausible to expect these individuals to accept the greater onus placed on them 
without some sort of corresponding compensation.  Supposing that the non-pecuniary 
benefits associated with the role are unlikely to change with such magnitude so as to 
offset this added risk, the other option is to increase the remuneration of council 
members for taking on this added responsibility.  Currently, most universities do not 
remunerate the majority of council members in their capacity as a member of council.  
Whether this will change as the responsibilities and roles of council members becomes 
more complex remains to be seen. 
 
2.3  Suggestions for Future Research 
Firms provide disclosure to mitigate the information and incentive problems due 
to moral hazard and agency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  
Of the common hypotheses explaining voluntary disclosure, the only ones that are 
applicable to universities are the management talent signalling and proprietary cost  
hypotheses, as the remainder are capital markets related. 
 
Atmadja and Tarca (2004) discuss the factors influencing the extent of 
disclosure.  Size has consistently been found to be positively associated with disclosure, 
however there is confusion as to what size represents (Foster, 1986).  McBride (1996) 
argues that larger firms have lower information production costs and lower proprietary 
costs associated with disclosures (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). 
 
Related to the proprietary cost hypothesis, different industries may differ in their 
levels of disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983; Cooke, 1989, 1991; Dye and Sridhar, 1995; 
Haven et al., 2002; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Raffournier, 1995).  Chow et al. (2004) and 
Chen and Jaggi (2000) find that independent boards have greater disclosure. Mak and Li 
(2001) find an inverse relationship between board size and voluntary disclosure, 
consistent with Jensen (1993).  Finally, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that a unitary 
leadership structure where one person holds the offices of both Chair and CEO result in 
decreased disclosure; Forker (1992) finds support for this.  Eng and Mak (2003) find a 
positive relationship between government ownership and disclosure.  A summary of the 
factors and their relationship to disclosure is detailed in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 
FACTORS AFFECTING DISCLOSURE 
  Factor  Relationship to the 
Level of Disclosure 
1. Government  ownership  Positive 
2. Independent  Directors  Positive 
3. Size  Positive 
4. Board  size  Negative 
5.  Unitary leadership structure  Negative 
6. Industry  Uncertain 
 
Given the relatively poor level of disclosure for universities, an interesting area 
for future research is to investigate the determinants of disclosure.  Has 
commercialisation resulted in university disclosure being driven by capital markets 
considerations relating to corporate governance and board structure, as is the case for 
firms? 
 
In addition, related to earnings persistence, does the annual report help us 
understand earnings persistence?  Do universities reporting losses or earnings decreases  
provide more disclosures to justify the loss or decrease?  Do universities with positive 
earnings or earnings increases disclose the likelihood of performance reoccurring in the 
future?  How do disclosures differ between universities reporting a loss or decrease in 
earnings and those reporting a surplus or increase in earnings?  How does the incidence 
of losses in Australian universities compare with universities worldwide and with 
Australian companies? 
 
Related to this, another possible avenue for future research is to look at 
university reporting practices in more depth.  For example, how do universities differ in 
their approach to valuation of non-current a s s e t s ?   W h a t  b a s i s  i s  u s e d  t o  v a l u e  
inventory?  How do these institutions differ in their choice of depreciation policy and 
useful life?  On what basis do they provide for doubtful debts relating to student 
debtors?  An informal analysis of annual report data gathered reveals that most 
universities use straight line depreciation although the estimation of useful life differs 
across institutions: does this reflect differences in the productivity of these assets?  How 
does heterogeneity across institutions compare to that across companies?  From casual 
observation, it also appears that there is considerable variation in the way universities 
provide for doubtful debts with some institutions leaving the provision relatively 
unchanged (or even decreasing this provision) when receivables increase by a relatively 
large amount.  This may be indicative of earnings management, however from the 
analysis of earnings quality this does not appear to be occurring in Australian 
universities.  Are universities becoming more aggressive in their revenue policies or are 
they targeting lower credit risk groups?  How does the structure of the council affect 
accounting policy choice? 
 
A further area for future research in light of the corporatisation pressures on 
universities is to explore how universities are encouraging entrepreneurship and 
innovation.  Often, universities create companies for specific ventures.  What 
repercussions are there for the university as owner and residual claimant of these firms?  
Similarly, what structures are universities likely to adopt in the future to address these 
concerns? 
 
Finally, focusing more on Vice-Chancellors, two possible areas for future 
research are outlined here.  The first is to look at whether instrumental traits are 
important in Vice-Chancellor appointment.  Currently, 29 of the 39 Vice-Chancellors in  
Australia (74 percent) are male, however, gender may not be a good proxy for 
instrumental traits of masculinity and femininity (Newby, 2004; Deaux and LaFrance, 
1998; Eagly et al., 2000; Hoffman, 2001).  For example, institution characteristics such 
as student: staff ratios may reflect more expressive (feminine) traits (as this statistic may 
proxy for the strength of relationships at the institution) and hence the institution may be 
biased toward a female Vice-Chancellor.  How do these institutional characteristics 
affect the choice of Vice-Chancellor appointment? 
 
The second line of research is related to the comparison between Vice-
Chancellors and CEOs.  Why have there have been so few cases of cross over between 
Vice-Chancellors and CEOs (in either direction)?  Possibly, this could be due to a lack 
of general transferable managerial skill between the two sectors, as suggested in the 
theory by Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) or different leadership styles at firms and 
universities.  Bass (1997) argues that transactional leaders are more likely than 
transformational leaders (Burns, 1978; Bass, 1987) to engage in unethical practices.  
Bass (1997) highlights the role of the transformational leader in increasing awareness of 
what is right, helping to elevate followers’ needs for achievement and encouraging 
followers to go beyond own self-interest for the good of the organisation.  In contrast, 
the transactional leader motivates followers through promises, rewards or threats of 
punishment, using manipulation, deception and contingent reinforcement for utilitarian 
purposes (Lichtenstein et al., 1995).  Do Vice-Chancellors tend to be transformational 
leaders and CEOs transactional leaders? If so, does the recent incidence of corporate 
fraud in companies reflect this bias toward transactional leaders?  As firms become 
more concerned with non-financial performance measures, will there be a shift toward 
transformational leaders and if so, what are the implications for the convergence 
between the market for CEOs and the market for Vice-Chancellors? 
 
Universities are large organisations and have important roles in society.  As they 
move away from the nonprofit end of the spectrum, it is hoped that future research will 
look in finer detail at the workings of these institutions to improve transparency and 
accountability to the public. 